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Abstract 
Of the countless methods for measuring the quality of life (QOL) that 
have been proposed and analyzed by the vast, multi-disciplinary literature 
over the past decades, only a select few are alluded to in Romanian scientific 
circles, and even fewer are actually implemented in practical applications. In 
adapting existing techniques and engineering a viable measurement system 
specific to Romania, there exists an important opportunity to re-evaluate the 
merits and shortcomings of established approaches. As a specific example, 
we consider the Standard Gamble (SG) method of eliciting “subjective 
utilities” related to particular health states. The re-evaluation is 
accomplished from three perspectives: theoretic consistency, interpretability 
and practicality. It is demonstrated that consistent with economic theory, the 
appropriate interpretation of SG derived measures is that of a Hicksian 
change in welfare valuation, rather than a cardinal measure of preferences. 
A practical consequence of the latter is that SG will necessarily produce a 
higher QOL value for individuals exhibiting more risk aversion. This leads us 
to contemplate that in fact SG may be a more appropriate methodology in 
other contexts, not necessarily health-related, where quality of life may 
indeed be correlated with the willingness to take risks. 
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Introduction 
The main purpose of this article is to contribute to the methodological 
development of instruments for the purpose of measuring quality of life (QOL) in 
Romania. By QOL measurement, we refer to the instruments, techniques and scales 
resulting in a unified quantitative assessment of well-being. Of course, developing 
methodology that can successfully measure through a minimal set of indicators 
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something as vast and multifaceted as well-being, is indeed a daunting task. 
Nevertheless, such methods by now boast a long and rich history of evolution in 
the scientific and public administration circles. 
The remarkable development in this field has undoubtedly been sustained 
by the persevering interest from a public policy perspective. This is hardly 
surprising – it is not difficult to imagine how a manageable set of quantities that 
convey information regarding the well-being of individuals or social groups 
provides an indispensable tool for guiding and monitoring policy. In fact, the 
interest has recently reached such a significance for policymakers as to compel 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy to organize a Commission for the purpose of 
constructing alternative indicators to replace the (typically GDP-based) figures 
derived from economic data, that would be more suitable for assessing societal 
well-being, as well as economic, environmental, and social sustainability (Stiglitz 
et al., 2009). 
While the collection of techniques that have been accumulated over the 
years is far too extensive to collate in general, several noticeable observations stand 
out. First, QOL measurement methods may be broadly classified as either 
representing objective social indicators or targeting the assessment of subjective 
well-being (SWB) (Diener and Suh, 1997). The latter approach, which accounts for 
individuals' subjective experiences, has gained particular notoriety in recent years. 
Beyond this classification, the development of specific measurement instruments 
appears to have taken a context-specific path. Given the vagueness and complexity 
of deriving a common, exhaustive definition of QOL, it seems natural that the 
various methodological evolutions have adhered to narrower domains where a 
more concrete understanding of the QOL construct is possible, and the resulting 
measures are destined for similar, well-defined applications. 
To that end, the most prolific work on such methodology is perhaps in the 
contexts of social indicators analysis and health-care applications. Stiglitz et al. 
(2009) and Diener and Suh (1997) provide a comprehensive list of references to the 
relevant social indicators literature. The line of work related to health-care is the 
primary focus of this article and is discussed extensively in what follows. However, 
it is interesting to further note that the development and application of QOL 
measurement methodologies has also extended to other domains. For example, 
these techniques have been recently utilized in research related to urban planning 
(Rogerson, 1999; Larson, 2010; Tazebay et al., 2010) as well as to analyzing 
livelihood under war-like conditions (Giacaman et al., 2007). In all, it is fair to 
conclude that regardless of the context, the effort is generally quite inter-
disciplinary. 
In contrast, the application and development of such methodology to 
address the needs specific to Romania's society has staggered considerably. Only a 
few scattered implementations of known techniques may be identified within the 
Romanian academic literature. These are almost exclusively restricted to the 
health-care domain, where a limited set of psychometric methods is considered in 
assessing QOL related to dental services (Lupu, 2006; Campian et al., 2008), 
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kidney replacement (Sinescu et al., 2008) and mental health (Ardelean et al., 2009). 
Public administration use of such tools is virtually nonexistent. Given this state of 
development, we focus our attention on health-care, where QOL has acquired the 
nomenclature, health-related quality of life (HRQoL). 
Nevertheless, our principle thesis is not restricted to the health-care 
domain, whereas the message we wish to advocate is the following. It is 
undisputable that the public policy interest in such tools, as discussed above, not 
only extends to Romania, but is in fact magnified as such given the rough period of 
transition and growth that currently prevails. Therefore, the question is not whether 
the development of QOL measurement methods, customized to the particularities 
of the Romanian society, is a worthwhile endeavor. Rather, what is of interest is 
how this development should be approached. To that end, ignoring the existing 
work on the relevant measurement methodology would be clearly inefficient – 
adapting existing instruments to the Romanian context is undoubtedly a more 
effective approach than reinventing such methods from scratch. On the other hand, 
blindly adopting existing measurements is likewise unadvisable. 
In addressing the latter, our main hypothesis is that inherent to the process 
of adapting existing techniques and engineering a viable measurement system 
specific to Romania, there exists an important opportunity to re-evaluate the merits 
and shortcomings of established approaches. Moreover, this re-evaluation need not 
be viewed strictly in a negative light. As a specific example within health-care, we 
consider the standard gamble (SG) method of eliciting “subjective utilities” related 
to particular states of health, in generating direct measures of HRQoL. Such 
measures have been applied in numerous medical contexts over the past four 
decades in conjunction with cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of various health-
care related programs. 
Consequently, we approach the re-evaluation from three angles. First, we 
re-examine the theoretical basis that founds the generally accepted justification for 
using SG in health-care. Based on our findings, we re-derive a more appropriate 
interpretation of the measures produced by the SG method as numerical assessments 
of QOL. Finally, taking together the theoretical and interpretative aspects, we re-
evaluate the practicality of the SG method in health-care applications. In large, we 
find that SG-derived values may be suitable in certain contexts, but should be 
approached with caution. In this sense, the analysis suggests that such measures may 
be in fact more fitting in assessing QOL outside of health-care, in domains where 
until now such methods have yet to be considered. 
 
Health-Related Quality of Life Measurement 
Quantitative assessment of an individual’s well-being related to health can 
be traced back to at least the work of Karnofsky and Burchenal (1949). Since then 
countless scales, techniques, procedures, etc. have been invented, debated, put into 
practice as well as rendered obsolete. The main aim of such assessments is to guide 
decisions regarding health-care initiatives, where a central goal is often improving 
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patients’ quality of life. In this context, existing methodologies may be classified in 
terms of four major categories: psychometric scales, quality of well-being scales 
(QWB), health utility indices (HUI) and utility measurements. 
All methods related to HRQoL assessment are essentially subjective 
measures. Classic psychometric scales in this context are derived based on 
information provided by individuals regarding the various dimensions of their 
health states. In particular, individuals are asked to rate specific aspects of their 
physical, mental and social functioning. These scores are subsequently combined in 
a standardized way to produce a unified assessment. In consequence, such 
psychometric scales encompass two objective properties: (i) establishing the 
dimensions of well-being as well as the specific elements that are relevant for its 
assessment, and (ii) assigning objective weights to each scored item in arriving at 
an overall assessment. QWB and HUI add a subjective layer to a typical 
psychometric scale by modifying (ii) such that the weights assigned to scored items 
are also provided by the individual. In this respect, QWB/HUI are hybrid 
instruments – forming a bridge between psychometric scales and utility 
measurements (Revicki and Kaplan, 1993). 
In contrast, methods falling within the class of utility measurements treat 
HRQoL as an entirely subjective construct. In this view, the various elements of 
mental, physical and social functioning define an individual's holistic health state. 
For each individual, in turn, various health states convey different degrees of 
appreciation or value, commonly referred to as the utility of the health state. Hence, 
utility measurements focus on assessing this final result – the subjective valuation 
of a particular holistic state of health. Implicit in such procedures is the subjective 
determination of what the various dimensions consist of, their degree of 
contribution to the overall well-being, as well as the way in which specific 
elements of the health states are combined in determining the final valuation. In 
other words, the individual decides the functional form of the utility as well as 
input variables; the researcher only observes the outcome of the subjective 
assessment. 
The SG method belongs to the utility assessment category of HRQoL 
measures. More specifically, it is part of a small set of techniques that generate 
elicited utilities, which is a notably different approach in that it does not require 
individuals to explicitly rate any aspect of their well-being. Instead, participants are 
asked to complete certain tasks that reveal implicitly the individual's valuation of a 
given health state. The SG method, along with its close sibling the time tradeoff 
(TTO) method were originally proposed by Torrance et al. (1972) and further 
popularized by Torrance (1986, 1987).1 According to Torrance (1986), the methods 
find their motivation in the economic concept, willingness-to-pay (WTP). The 
                                                 
1 To be clear, while the TTO method is an entirely novel technique attributable to 
Torrance et al. (1972), the SG method is a direct adaptation of (one variant of) a technique 
by the same name founded in decision theory (see for example, Farquhar, 1984). The 
originality, therefore, lies in its application to measuring HRQoL. 
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latter, it is argued, is particularly suitable for economic appraisal of medical 
initiatives and CEA. However, its use in the medical field has been generally 
discouraged by operational difficulties. 
Accordingly, SG and TTO provide alternative methods of the same nature 
as WTP, but with the advantage that they are simpler to implement in practice. 
Hence, their application facilitates CEA, or more appropriately in this case, cost 
utility analysis CUA. Interestingly, the original conception of the methods 
establishes SG as the theoretically founded methodology, with TTO being a more 
practical alternative (in that participants find it easier to relate to TTO tasks, 
compared to SG tasks), albeit lacking any theoretical underpinning. What is the 
claimed theoretical justification for the SG technique? Simply, the argument 
unveils, it yields a cardinal utility measure of the individual's strength of 
preferences for a particular health state, which is in direct alignment with modern 
economic utility theory. 
Incidentally, over two decades after its initial appearance, the TTO method 
was endowed with a theoretical justification by Buckingham and Devlin (2006), 
who elegantly demonstrated that TTO may be correctly interpreted as a Hicksian 
change in welfare measure. This interpretation, of course, bears a strong 
resemblance to WTP: while WTP measures welfare change by quantifying (for 
example) how much wealth/income an individual would be willing to forego to 
achieve a better health-state, TTO provides a corresponding measure in time units 
by quantifying how much (life) time the individual would renounce to achieve the 
same health improvement. Therefore, TTO is indeed firmly grounded in economic 
theory. Meanwhile, the cardinal utility explanation supporting SG-derived values 
has largely prevailed – that its interpretation as a measure of cardinal utility 
validates the SG method on a theoretical level is systematically accepted by the 
vast literature that it has inspired. 
To an economist, this is of course unsettling. The concept of cardinal 
utility has been widely abandoned by the majority of economic analysis in favor of 
the more methodologically sound concept of ordinal utility. While a formal 
analysis is beyond the scope of the present discussion (interested readers are 
referred to Fishburn (1989) for an eloquent account of the history of utility theory 
in economics), we briefly point out that central to this view are two aspects: (i) the 
axiomization required to establish cardinality in utility has proven to entail 
formidable problems in relating it to credible consumer psychology, and (ii) 
cardinality is largely unnecessary for economic analysis in the sense that an ordinal 
ranking of preferences is sufficient to rigorously establish economic results. From 
an economics perspective, utility plays little more than the role of an operationally 
convenient tool – it is a quantitative index representing preferences that greatly 
simplifies analytical operation (e.g. it is far simpler to maximize a utility function 
than to search for the most preferred bundle of goods among all possible bundles). 
How does the medical care literature arrive at the conclusion that the SG 
method produces a cardinal measure of an individual’s preferences? In essence, by 
ignoring the first point and dismissing the second as irrelevant. For example, 
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Torrance (1987) proclaims that “a simple definition of utility is that it is a cardinal 
measure of the strength of one’s preference.” This declaration is further sustained 
several explicit assertions that while ordinal utility is conventional for 
microeconomists, an equally valid view of utility is that of a cardinal valuation of 
one’s strength of preferences; all that is necessary is a simple switch of axioms. In 
this way, utility theory is easily extendible outside of the microecnomic context, 
and all the relevant precautions – such as the impossibility of aggregating utilities 
across individuals – s may be readily ignored. 
Unfortunately, the SG method is not vested with a proprietary set of 
axioms that formally establish the claimed cardinality of preferences. Rather, this 
complication is circumvented by appealing to the axioms of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (vN-M), upon which their utility theory is founded (vonNeumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). From there, the cardinality is forced directly by tying vN-M 
utilities to cardinal measures of strength of preferences. Unfortunately, within the 
context of economic theory, which defines the setting for von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s work, no such connection is possible, a fact that is firmly rooted in 
the economics perspective since at least the 1950’s. Section 3 is dedicated to a 
more in-depth examination of why this is so. 
From a practical perspective, despite their overall popularity, utility 
elicitation methods have encountered a number of conceptual and methodological 
difficulties in health-care applications. For example, they sparked considerable 
controversy regarding the use of utility assessments as a basis for administrative 
decision making in the medical care practice (Mulley, 1989). On the 
methodological side, attention is devoted to the invariance and inconsistency 
confounding HRQoL measures derived from utility elicitation, where invariance 
refers to participants exhibiting an equivalent preference for distinct health states, 
and inconsistency describes situations where individuals yield higher valuations for 
clinically inferior health states. Interestingly, both types of errors seem to be more 
prevalent in SG implementations. 
In this context, the errors are generally attributed to the inability of 
participants to correctly complete the task at hand. From this premise, focus has 
been mainly concentrated on either linking participant incompetence to personal 
characteristics such as education level, ethnicity, etc. (Bravata et al., 2010), or on 
attempts to design procedures to “correct” for the incompetence (Lenert et al., 
2003). The latter mainly involves intercepting “illogical” responses and persuading 
participants to modify them. Evidently, what constitutes an illogical response is 
determined by the researcher, presumably based on the objective clinical 
evaluations of the health states. Of course, one might wonder as to the purpose of 
soliciting purely subjective assessments of well-being, which are required to 
conform to some predetermined objective evaluative criteria. 
Perhaps of the more serious methodological issues identified, is the 
internal inconsistency of the SG method. In particular, Llewellyn-Thomas et al. 
(1982) through a series of experiments find that changes in gamble outcomes exert 
a significant influence on the resulting valuations. Although it has not received as 
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much attention as the invariance/ inconsistency topic, this arguably presents a far 
greater cause for concern. In fact, it is by now well known in the decision analysis 
literature (where the SG method finds its roots) that this and similar types of 
preference elicitation methods embody a variety of important response biases. 
Accordingly, a comprehensive survey and analysis of this subject is provided in 
Schwand et al. (2010), most of which has yet to find its way into the relevant 
health-care literature. 
Related to the methodological concerns uncovered and omitted by the 
health-care community, we wish to emphasize the following. To properly identify, 
interpret and possibly correct sources of errors in utility elicitation procedures, it 
imperative to unchain this methodology from the burden of cardinality. For 
example, as demonstrated in subsequent sections, invariance in many situations 
arises quite naturally in the SG context, where only minor errors on the part of the 
participants are sufficient to generate indifference in revealed preferences. This 
serves to underline precisely a central theme of this article. The purpose of re-
evaluating the theoretical justification of a particular method need not necessarily 
be to invalidate it. Rather, the more positive motivation as in our case, may be to 
construct a more accurate interpretation, and in doing so, to allow for a more 
effective assessment of how and where the methods are best applied, as well as to 
guide extensions that better account for the various sources of related errors. 
 
The Standard Gamble and Expected Utility Theory 
The standard gamble methodology is based on a remarkably simple 
procedure. In short, the SG task lays out to the participant two alternatives. Under 
the first alternative, the individual would remain in a particular state of health 
(guaranteed) for the remainder of her life. The second alternative, however, 
involves a gamble with two possible outcomes; with probability   the participant 
would attain perfect health for the rest of her life, while with probability 1  
instant death would result. The objective, then, is to find the probability *  at 
which the individual is exactly indifferent between alternatives 1 and 2 .2 
To understand how this procedure is related to the vN-M expected utility 
theory, let us restate a (grossly oversimplified) rendition of the theory's main result, 
as is fit for our purposes. To this end, consider some possible outcomes 
umml yyyy ,,,   that can be ordered in terms of preferences such that either 
mm yy   (e.g. my  is preferred to my ), mm yy   (e.g. my  is preferred to my ) or 
mm yy   (e.g. my  is indifferent to my ), with a presupposed ordering 
uml yyy  , uml yyy   . Under some “reasonable axioms,” for any lottery L  
which results in uy  with probability   and ly  with probability 1  (denoted by 
                                                 
2 For more details, especially those pertaining to health state description, see 
Torrance (1986, 1987). 
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the triplet ),;( ul yyL  ), and similarly L  which results in uy  with probability 
   and ly  with probability  1  (denoted as ),;( ul yyL   ), the axioms hold 
if and only if there exists a real valued function v  defined by  
)()(1)(=)(=)( lum yvyvLvyv                                  (1) 
such that 
)(>)( LvLvLL                                                          (2) 
Hence, directly employing the specification (1) and arbitrarily setting 0=)( lyv  
and 1=)( uyv , it is clear that the probability that defines the lottery determines the 
numerical utility value as =)( mhv . 
Mathematically, the SG method is predicated on the foregoing conclusion. 
The procedure elicits “subjective utility values” by requesting an individual to 
specify the probability   that establishes indifference between the certain outcome 
my  and the lottery L . Consequently, with   and    obtained in this manner, a 
comparison of the resulting numerical values corresponds directly to the 
comparison in preferences between the outcomes my  and my ; the individual 
prefers my  to my  if and only if  >  is chosen. However, this the extent of 
expected utility theory's involvement in the SG methodology; the idea that   
provides a numerical assessment of an individual's valuation of a particular health 
state, a value that is moreover comparable across individuals, is conceptually 
predicated on elements beyond the scope of the vN-M theory. 
Specifically, two crucial components are incorporated by the SG 
methodology in extending the vN-M utility index to a quality of life measure: 
1) )( myv  is a cardinal utility measure in the sense that it measures an 
individual’s strength of preferences; 
2) the outcomes (e.g. ly , my , my , uy , etc.) on which expected utility theory 
operates may be reasonably treated as health states.  
 The first conceptual component is claimed explicitly in the literature that 
promotes the theoretical validity of the method (Torrance, 1986, 1987). The second 
is implicit in nature. Both components are essential to the justification of                        
SG-elicited utilities as measuring QOL and neither is trivial. We presently examine 
each of the components in further detail. 
Let us begin the analysis of the cardinality claim with an closer reading of 
Torrance (1986), where it is established that 
the standard gamble measurement technique is valid by definition because 
it is based directly on the [vN-M] axioms, and the validity of the other 
techniques can be determined by comparison. (Torrance, 1986, p. 27) 
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Accordingly, the validity claim arises from the premise that vN-M utilities are 
themselves cardinal:  
The standard gamble is the classical method of measuring cardinal 
preferences. It is based directly on the fundamental axioms of utility 
theory, first presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern. (Torrance, 1986, 
p. 20) 
Astonishingly, the fact this premise is strictly incompatible with economic theory is 
entirely overlooked. 
Since as early as the 1950’s, economists have exhaustively demonstrated 
that the cardinality of the function )( myv  is strictly a mathematical property. Work 
by the likes of Ellsberg (1954) and Baumol (1958) were among the first to establish 
that this property does not bear and cannot be misconstrued as bearing any relation 
to the economic concept of cardinality in terms of measuring pleasure, 
appreciation, satisfaction, etc. Likewise, Luce and Raiffa (1957) formally outlined 
the fallacies of associating vN-M utilities with an assessment of the strength of an 
individual's preferences. 
In fact, in their seminal work von Neumann and Morgenstern never sought 
such a conclusion. Their undertaking was motivated by a need to operationally 
simplify the analytical burden pertaining to game theory analysis. Indeed, their 
purpose was accomplished with irrefutable success; as Baumol (1958) explicitly 
demonstrates, maximizing vN-M utilities invariably leads to correct predictions of 
an individual's choice of lotteries. The direct implication of this, of course, is that 
behavior under uncertainty may be accurately predicted (to the extent that the vN-
M axioms hold) by modeling the individual as maximizing expected utility. 
However, beyond facilitating prediction of individual behavior, there is no other 
explicit or implicit purpose envisioned by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 
developing their remarkable theory. Especially, the fact that in their own exposition 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) they explicitly divorce their approach from 
any concept related to a cardinal measurement of preferences, is attested to by the 
thorough introspective of Fishburn (1989). 
We dedicate the remainder of this section to illustrating the economics 
interpretation of vN-M utilities. Hence, begin by considering a standard textbook 
example of consumer behavior: exactly two goods are available for consumption, 
quantities of which ( 21, xx ) are optimally chosen by maximizing utility subject to a 
linear budget constraint. Assume for the simplicity of the example that utility is of 
the Cobb Douglas form and the budget constraint consists of income y  and the 
price of good 1, denoted by p .3 By convention, good 2  is treated as the 
                                                 
3 Our main results, however, are readily extendible to the general utility function 
form )(u . 
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numeraire good with unitary price. Consequently, the mathematical formulation is 
typically expressed  
1221,
s.t.),(max
21
pxyxxxu
xx
        (3) 
Assuming the consumer is completely informed (e.g. all exogenous information is 
known with certainty), it is well known that setting either  2121 =),( xxxxu  or 
2121 lnln=),( xxxxu    leads to the same optimal choices  
)/(=*1 pyx 


 (4) 
yx



=*2  (5) 
In fact, the very same combination of good 1 and good 2  is chosen under any 
monotonic transformation of u . It is in this sense that the utility function ),( 21 xxu  
is regarded as ordinal. 
Continuing with the example under certainty, substituting the optimal 
consumption values *2
*
1 , xx  into the utility function yields the indirect utility 
function  






p
yypv

 )(
=),(                      (6) 
Note that this expression involves only the exogenously determined price and 
income. Intuitively, it is referred to as indirect utility because the consumer does 
not derive pleasure or satisfaction directly from price and income. Rather these 
variables have a direct effect on an individual's choice of consumption bundle, 
which in turn, directly determines her utility. 
The significance of the latter point is the following. If the price of good 1 
decreases exogenously, it is typically regarded as having a positive effect on the 
individual's utility. However, this is not due to a direct relationship as the 
individual does not care about the decrease in price, per se. On the other hand, 
assuming that y  remains unchanged, the lower price level effectively expands her 
budget constraint such as to allow a more favorable choice of 21, xx . Of course, 
consuming a more preferred combination of the two goods indeed brings a higher 
degree of satisfaction to the consumer. 
Furthermore, we may ask the question how much income would the 
individual be willing to give up in order to obtain the price decrease, i.e. to be just 
as well off with the price decrease (and lower income) as she was originally? Such 
a question leads us to consider the tradeoff between price and income at a constant 
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utility level. In other words, we utilize the indifference curve between price and 
income derived from the indirect utility function. If the price decrease under 
consideration is infinitesimal, then the answer is the marginal rate of substitution 
between price and income, times the price decrease (e.g. dpdy yp ,MRS= ).4 
Alternatively, if we examine a more substantial price decrease, then the necessary 
income reduction ( y ) is referred to as the compensating variation of the price 
decrease, and is computed from the indifference curve as 


 )/(11=/ ppyy . Neither dy  nor y  is affected by monotonic 
transformations of u . 
It is also worthwhile to observe that if the original utility level is denoted 
as u  and the utility achieved under the decreased price as u , then y  measures 
the distance between utility levels u  and u . Two comments regarding this 
observation are in order. First, the metric, in this case, is clearly specified – utility 
changes are being measured in monetary units. Second, while the income-based 
metric is obviously cardinal (it is defined up to a fixed origin and a scale in terms 
of the particular monetary unit, e.g. dollar, euro, etc.), the utilities whose distance is 
being evaluated are still ordinal. That is, the same numeric distance results 
regardless of the particular monotonic form ascribed to u  and u . As will be seen 
shortly, the latter bears a strong tie to the interpretation of the vN-M metric as a 
cardinal measure. 
Expanding on our simple example, let us consider the individual's choice 
when the income level is no longer known with certainty, but rather the only 
information available is  





1w.p.
w.p.
=
l
u
y
y
y  (7) 
Thus, we wish to analyze the situation where a consumer must choose the optimal 
consumption bundle while facing a lottery as the source of her budget constraint, 
instead of a fixed income level. Since the budget constraint is binding, we may 
assume without loss of generality that the consumer will explicitly choose a 
specific consumption level of good 1, and let the quantity of good 2  be 
determined ex post by 1x  as well as the outcome of the income lottery. 
Therefore, if the consumer's psychology is consistent with the vN-M 
axioms, then their expected utility theory tells that the consumer determines her 
optimal consumption bundle by maximizing expected utility as  
 
12
11111 ),(~)(1),(~max
1
pxyx
pxyxupxyxux lux

 
 
                                                 
4 By Roy’s Identity, it is of course the Marshallian demand, times the price decrease. 
 92
The point of emphasis is that the solution to (8) does depend on the functional form 
of u~ . That is,  2121 =),(~ xxxxu  or 2121 lnln=),(~ xxxxu    now lead to 
different solutions of optimal consumption levels *2
*
1 , xx . It is tempting to conclude 
from this that under uncertainty, expected utility maximization does indeed induce 
cardinality in the utility index, i.e. under expected utility maximization the utility 
function conveys quantifiable information on the strength of preferences. 
Such a conclusion, however, is largely misguided. The relevant question is 
whether observing choice under uncertainty would reveal more information about 
the consumer's preferences with respect to goods 1 and 2 . The answer is no. 
Specifically, letting  2121 =),(~ xxxxu  it can be easily shown that solving (8) is 
equivalent to maximizing  
   1111221, ))((1)(s.t.),(max21
 pxypxyxxxu luxx  
while if 2121 xlnβxlnα=)x,(xu~  , then the corresponding maximization 
problem is formulated as  
   111221, )()(s.t.),(max21
pxypxyxxxu luxx  
It can be shown that the above is extendable to any monotonic transformation of 
u~ : such transformations do not affect the underlying utility function ),( 21 xxu  that 
captures the individual's attitude towards the consumption of the two goods. 
Instead, monotonic variations of u~  in expected utility maximization simply reflect 
differences in how the individual perceives her budget constraint under 
uncertainty. 
The concept is depicted graphically in Figure 1. If either ly  or uy  is 
known to occur with certainty, then the budget constraint is linear (at the respective 
income level) and standard textbook analysis applies. However, when the income 
occurs due to chance, such that deterministic income in the budget constraint is 
replaced by the lottery ),;( ul yy , then the perceived stochastic budget 
constrained (PSBC) takes on a curved shape between the two limiting budget 
constraints. The “perceived” element in the labeling reflects the fact that the 
particular shape of this budget constraint is subjective – it depends on the 
individual's attitude regarding risk. For example, risk neutrality in this case may be 
attributed to a linear PSBC. In general, the shape of the PSBC will be weakly 
concave, and therefore, interior solutions prevail under uncertainty. 
 93
   
 
Fig. 1. Perceived Stochastic Budget Constraint 
 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the indifference map remains unchanged 
regardless of the individual's information about income or her risk attitude. Hence, 
there is no novelty being generated by uncertainty as to the strength of preferences 
between bundles of good 1 and good 2 . On the other hand, the probability   on 
which the lottery ),;( ul yyL   is founded, serves to shift the PSBC similar to 
the way in which the income level shifts an ordinary budget constraint in the full 
information case. 
The analogy, therefore, is that under uncertainty we replace income y  
with the lottery L . Consequently, indifference curves based on indirect utility 
functions may be constructed between elements of L  and other exogenous 
factors.5 If we assume that the the support of the lottery (i.e. ul yy , ) remains fixed, 
the latter amounts to posing exogenous factors against  . Accordingly,   may be 
used to measure a change in welfare induced by those alternative exogenous 
variables, and in consequence,   represents a metric by which utility distances 
may be measured, in the spirit of the income-based metric relevant under certainty. 
That is, instead of y  we may consider differences in the lotteries, whereby 
denoting ),(0;0 ul yyL   and ),;( ** ul yyL  , define the difference operator 
0,*  on L  as the difference between 0L  and *L , respectively  
*0,*  L  (11) 
 
                                                 
5 Smidts (1997) refers to vN-M utilities, in interpreting Fishburn (1989), as 
“probabilistic indifference curves measured by means of lotteries.” 
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This definition is operational to the extent that it is consistent with 
measuring welfare change between any utility levels represented by indifference 
curves passing through the area between the limiting budget constraints. For 
example, following Figure 1, L0,*  (equivalently * ) measures the distance from 
0u  to *u . Moreover, one can measure the distance from *u  to 1u  by computing  
*†0,*†0,†*, ==   LL  (12) 
The important question then becomes what is the nature of such a metric? That is, 
if income quantifies differences in utilities on the money-metric scale, then what is 
the unit of measurement induced by probabilities? One possible interpretation is 
that   measures utility differences in risk units. Section 4 examines this idea 
further, in terms of health states. A topic worthy of a more profound analysis, of 
course, is whether this is reasonable measurement unit for health-care applications. 
 
Expected Health vs. Risk Tradeoff 
The exposition of the preceding section illustrated that in the standard 
economic perspective, vN-M utilities bear no connection to the concept of cardinal 
utility, in the sense of measuring strength of preferences. Instead, it was 
demonstrated that the numeric value assigned to such a utility by equating it to a 
pertinently elicited probability, is more appropriately interpreted as a change in 
welfare measure, in risk units. Observe that the analysis thus far has concentrated 
on income as outcomes relevant for the vN-M expected utility theory. Income, of 
course, plays a well defined role in economic analysis and is straightforwardly 
related to consumer choice. Accordingly, while our main interest is not measuring 
utility related to income, but rather that related to health states, this conventional 
framework is useful for at least two reasons: (i) it serves to clarify the theoretical 
basis for the SG method as applied in QOL assessment, and (ii) it offers guidance 
as to how health states may be incorporated into the corresponding theory as the 
relevant outcomes. 
To expand on the latter, it is imperative that a distinct, conspicuous 
connection is established between health states and individual choice. Otherwise, 
valuing such health states is exclusively a psychology exercise, not an economic 
one, and involving the vN-M theory in this case is taking it entirely out of context. 
The manner in which health states may be related to choice deserves serious 
reflection. If a direct analogy is established between income and health states, then 
one must keep in mind that income is conventionally considered to affect utility 
only indirectly by influencing the optimal consumption of a bundle of goods. If, on 
the other hand, a certain health state is regarded a entering the utility function 
directly, one must take extra care in correctly interpreting a methodology that 
departs from the conventional framework. 
One particular example of a model that relates health states to choice is 
that of Meltzer (1997), with extensions particular interesting in the context of the 
present discussion by Basu et al. (2005, 2009, 2010). In this model, an individual is 
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able to affect her health state at the expense of consumption by investing in health-
care and reducing her disposable income:  
  myccmhu
m
s.t.),(max  (13) 
Therefore, a health states embodies both endogenous (that part that can be affected 
investment level m ) and exogenous components. Moreover, the model is easily 
extendible to choices arising outside of consumption. For example, one might 
easily replace income with time and consumption with leisure to obtain a tradeoff 
between health and leisure.6 In the latter case, an individual would be faced with 
the choice of how much of her leisure time to dedicate to improving her state of 
health (e.g. exercising, etc.), where once again she derives utility directly from both 
elements. 
In application to the model in (13), and to a reasonable extent more 
genetically, the SG method may be related to expected utility theory as follows. 
When faced with a SG task, a participant in the study will choose the break-even 
probability   by considering the tradeoff between risk and expected health. 
Specifically, if she prefers more health and less risk, then an indifference map to 
reflect her decision may be constructed as depicted in Figure 2.  
   
Fig. 2. Risk vs.Expected Health 
 
Accordingly, the risk – expected health tradeoff is also directly embodied 
in the gamble itself, where all feasible combinations are designated by the rotated 
“U” curve in the plot. 
                                                 
6 We acknowledge that, as was pointed out by participants at the 2011 Symposium 
“Dreptul la bunăstare – viitorul economiei româneşti”, time and income are not generally 
interchangeable since income is feasibly infinite while time is necessarily finite. In some 
special cases, this certainly is an important consideration. Nevertheless, to the extent that in 
a significant portion of economic problems income is treated as a finite constraint on the 
individual's choice, the extension to time/leisure (and the like) seems reasonably 
appropriate. 
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Furthermore, the shape of the indifference curves, in this case, directly 
relates to the degree of risk aversion characterizing the participant in the SG task. 
Specifically, more risk averse participants are represented by more convex, steeper 
sloping indifference curves (accordingly, flat indifference curves imply risk 
neutrality). Moreover, each indifference curve relates a certainty equivalent health 
state (e.g. with zero risk) to a lottery with a higher expected health and greater risk. 
The fact that the two lie on the same indifference curve, obviously indicates that 
the participant is indifferent between the two options. Therefore, we may envision 
measuring the distance between the utility of some health state *h  and that of 
perfect health ph , by moving away from the riskless point ph  along the inverted 
“U” curve, until the indifference curve capturing *h  is intersected. At this 
intersection, lies the lottery defined by * , which provides the same amount of 
utility to the participant as the riskless health state *h . Consequently, the distance 
between utilities derived from *h  and ph  is quantified as *1  . 
Hence, this is another way to illustrate the fact that the probabilities 
elicited by the SG method, in fact, measure distances between utilities (or changes 
in welfare) rather than any cardinal utility values. More importantly, by 
considering the measurement procedure in this light, we explicitly account for the 
crucial element driving the resulting valuation – the participant’s risk aversion with 
respect to the SG task. An important consequence of this is that it offers one 
potential explanation of the invariance often found in SG-based quality of life 
measures: a higher degree of risk aversion and hence steeper indifference curves, 
lead to a greater proportion of health states to be associated with lotteries 
concentrated at similar probability values (close to 1), where distinctions are more 
difficult for participants to identify. Therefore, risk aversion may be one simple 
reason for the encountered invariance in practice. 
 
Conclusions 
On theoretical grounds, the probabilities elicited by the SG method cannot 
be justified as measuring a cardinal utility index that quantifies the individual’s 
strength of preferences; ascribing such an interpretation of cardinality to vN-M 
utilities is at odds with conventional economic theory. On the other hand, because 
vN-M utilities may be appropriately viewed as measuring welfare change or utility 
differences, as discussed in section 3, the QOL measure generated by the SG 
method may be interpreted form this perspective as well. The latter is, of course, 
predicated on successfully relating health states to an individual’s choice, such as 
to make economic decision theory applicable. 
In this respect, economic theory suggests that SG-elicited probabilities may 
be regarded as capturing utility differences quantified by probabilistic risk units. 
This interpretation aligns SG with the closely related utility elicitation methods 
TTO and WTP as measures of welfare change. However, while the QOL index 
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generated by TTO is readily interpretable as quality adjusted life years (QALYs) 
(Torrance et al., 1989), and likewise for the WTP method as quality adjusted 
wealth (QAW), the corresponding QOL index derived from the SG method does 
not convey a similarly obvious, natural interpretation. 
The most concrete characterization of SG is that it reflects the individual’s 
attitude towards risk. The question, however, is whether this is an acceptable 
property of a QOL index? According to Lenert and Kaplan (2000), it is in fact 
desirable. Yet, they offer little explanation as to why this should be so, which 
leaves a number of important gaps in the analysis. The fundamental problem is 
relating risk attitude to an individual’s valuation of health states. Why should a 
particular health state’s effect on an individual’s well-being be driven by her 
attitude towards risk? Lenert and Kaplan (2000) make reference in this regard to a 
potential decisions one might face when presented with a risky surgery (as a 
treatment option, say, for a serious illness). 
Care must be taken, however, in assimilating the risk attitude exhibited by 
an individual in completing the SG task to the risk attitude present in deciding upon 
risky treatments – risk attitudes are likely to take on dramatically different forms 
across various contexts. In addition, serious illness accompanied by risky treatment 
options characterizes only a small fraction of situation in which a subjective 
valuation of health state is typically sought. In general, there is no obvious place 
for uncertainty in an individual's decisions related to health, and therefore, no clear 
connection between how risk attitude inherent to the SG task reflects such 
decisions and the utility derived from them. 
To expand on the latter perspective, one might generally inquire whether 
the risk attitude captured by the SG-elicited probability truly reflects a risk 
preference of the individual or just that of the participant. In other words, does a 
participant’s risk attitude, which influences her decisions in completing the SG 
task, extend beyond the experimental setting? The decision theory literature that 
Lenert and Kaplan (2000) cite in supporting the desirable risk preference property 
of the SG method takes into serious consideration the concept of intrinsic risk 
attitude (Bell and Raiffa, 1982; Dyer and Sarin, 1982; Smidts, 1997). In this view, 
an individual facing a choice under uncertainty is induced with a certain risk 
preference specific to the situation and not related to any underlying preferences or 
valuation of resulting outcomes. Consequently, if intrinsic risk attitude is 
applicable to a particular SG experiment, then the captured risk preference is 
simply an artifact of the methodology.7 
To what extent the above considerations are significant when applying the 
SG method depends on the specific case at hand. The point of emphasis is that by 
better understanding the theoretical framework in which SG-elicited measurements 
arise, we can better interpret the results obtained according the context within 
                                                 
7 This is inline with the findings of Hellinger (1989) that in health-related decisions 
under uncertainty, “risk attitudes are not absolute but are functions of the parameters in the 
gamble”.  
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which we operate. To that end, the usefulness of the SG method relative to its 
utility elicitation counterparts (TTO and WTP), as well as other non-utility based 
measures, is a practical matter. Regardless of which theory we base the derivation 
of the method on, as long as its results can be properly interpreted and deemed 
useful as such, the methodology is likewise useful. The common theme of this 
article is that the latter is generally context-dependent. 
Nevertheless, there is a property of the SG method with respect to risk that 
is generalizable across contexts. As is immediately evident from Figure 2 (and may 
be verified formally without excessive analytic complexity), the SG-based QOL 
measures invariably reward risk aversion. Specifically, an individual with a higher 
degree of risk aversion will always yield a higher elicited  , and thus, will 
necessarily be assigned a higher QOL value for the same health state as an 
individual with less risk aversion. In our view, this is a somewhat confounding 
property of HRQoL assessment, especially in application to cost effectiveness 
analysis. Besides generating considerable difficulties of aggregating such measures 
across individuals with varying degrees of risk aversion, the ensuing CEA based on 
such a measure will yield a more favorable assessment to a certain health-care 
initiative among groups of individuals with more risk aversion, even if differences 
in health-care improvements across the groups are negligible. 
On the other hand, the interpretation suggests that the SG methodology 
may be well suited in evaluating subjective well-being in situations inherently 
characterized by risky choices. One might imagine the potential for such situations 
as arising, for example, in connection with living environments. In particular, this 
may be an interesting application in conflict regions where “gambles” involving 
possible improvements in livelihood at the risk of death are often encountered. 
Risk aversion, in this case, may indeed be correlated with perceived well-being. 
More specific to Romania, a potentially suitable application may present itself in 
terms of evaluating subjective well-being of individuals involved in certain 
hazardous occupations, a topic that, to the best of our knowledge, has yet to be 
approached from any methodological perspective. 
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